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USING CONSTITUTIONAL 
ADmDICATION TO REMEDY 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC INmSTICE: 
COMPARATIVE LESSON FROM 
SOUTH AFRICA 
Eric C. Christiansen· 
This article seeks to explore the effectiveness of constitutional 
protection and court adjudication of social welfare rights as tools to 
address and remedy social injustice and economic inequality. The 
focus of this examination will be on South Africa and its post-
apartheid Constitution that enumerates rights and protections 
intended to remedy the economic injustices of the country's past. 
This article argues that the model of adjudicating social rights in 
South Africa is exportable to other countries, while clarifYing the 
reasonable expectations and potential contributions of such adjudi-
cation toward the achievement of socio-economic justice. Part I ad-
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dresses two questions: first, why look to constitutional social welfare 
rights as a new solution when they have long existed?; second, why 
look to South Africa for guidance? Part II examines South Africa's 
relevant post-apartheid jurisprudence, focusing on the novel concept 
of "differentiated incorporation, " the exportable process by which 
South Africa defended its acijudication against claims of the non-
justiciability of socio-economic rights. Finally, Part III addresses 
the question of whether South African social rights provisions have 
served their goals. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Advocates and scholars have long queried whether constitutional pro-
tection of socio-economic rights can advance the cause of social justice. 
Does inclusion of social welfare rights l in the text of a constitution assist a 
country in addressing the challenges of poverty and economic injustice? 
Can judicial enforcement of rights to housing, healthcare, education, and 
other welfare necessities advance substantive socio-economic equality in the 
manner that traditional rights adjudication has advanced the related goal of 
civil and political equality?2 The purpose of this article is to explore whether 
constitutional protection and court adjudication of social welfare rights are 
viable tools to address social injustice and remedy persistent economic in-
equality. 
In examining these issues, the first decade of adjudication of socio-
economic rights by the Constitutional Court of South Africa provides unique 
and remarkable comparative law insights. South Africa's post-apartheid 
Constitution includes among its enumerated rights a host of protections in-
1 There is no fixed list of those rights properly defined as "socio-economic" rights. For pur-
poses of this article, those rights include the set of rights in the South African Constitution 
that are traditionally and consistently identified as socio-economic rights by commentators, 
have been so identified by the South African Constitutional Court, or have as their evident 
purpose the improvement of an individual's social welfare: housing, healthcare, and educa-
tion, among others. Similarly, I use the adjectives "social," "social welfare" and "socio-
economic" to describe the same rights; I have avoided terms such as "red" rights, "second-
generation" rights, and "positive" rights as less helpful descriptors for the same rights. The 
arguments presented in this article are not dependent on a particular collection of rights. 
2 By using the term "substantive socio-economic equality" (and related terms, such as "eco-
nomic equality," socio-economic injustice," or "substantive equality"), I am not referring to an 
imaginary, utopian perfect parity of means. Rather, I mean only to identify the aspiration of a 
country to relative equality on socio-economic terms, such that participation in society is un-
hindered by such factors. I presume that, at a minimum, inclusion of enforceable socio-
economic rights presupposes a constitutional requirement for governmental action to address 
structural factors, both public and private, that contribute to endemic poverty. However, 
achievement of "equality" in this sense must call for more than mere equality of economic 
opportunity. Social rights go beyond merely negative rights; they require more than only the 
removal of formal, state-sponsored barriers to participation in economic life and its benefits. 
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tended to remedy the economic injustices of the past. The Court has dealt 
effectively with claims of the non-justiciability of social rights through a 
process of "differentiated incorporation," and has addressed specific social 
rights, most notably, housing and healthcare, in multiple cases. South Afri-
ca's affirmative jurisprudence of socio-economic rights enforceability is a 
novel and important contribution to the struggle against poverty-and an in-
valuable experiment into the courts' capacity to advance social justice. 
But is the South African approach a model other nations can follow, and 
is it successful enough that other countries should adopt it? As this article 
discusses, the approach is adaptable to local conditions and thus potentially 
exportable to other nations, but the actual advancement of social welfare has 
been incomplete and irregular. The South African Constitutional Court has 
enforced socio-economic rights infrequently and in a less expansive manner 
than civil and political rights. There are reasonable justifications for this and 
historical analogies caution against immodest expectations, but there are also 
genuine reasons for disappointment. What does the slow pace of socio-
economic advancement tell us about the value of constitutional protection of 
such rights in South Africa and elsewhere? This article will use the specific 
South African experience to evaluate the general capacity of constitutional-
ly-enforced social welfare rights to advance socio-economic equality. 
Part I addresses two preliminary questions: why examine constitutional 
social welfare rights as a potentially new solution when they have existed for 
many generations; and, why look primarily to South Africa for guidance? 
Part II summarizes and evaluates South Africa's relevant post-apartheid juri-
sprudence, focusing upon the novel concept of differentiated incorporation, 
the exportable process by which South Africa countered claims against the 
justiciability of socio-economic rights.3 Finally, Part III applies the lessons 
of the preceding Parts to the question of whether the South African social 
rights provisions have served their goals. This assessment clarifies the rea-
sonable expectations and potential contributions of constitutional social wel-
fare rights in service of a nation's goal of remedying socio-economic injus-
tice. 
3 Background elements of this article are examined in greater detail in two prior works by the 
author: Eric C. Christiansen, Adjudicating Non-Justiciable Rights: Socio-economic Rights 
and the South African Constitutional Court, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 321 (2007) [herei-
nafter Christiansen, Adjudicating Non-Justiciable Rights] (introducing "differentiated incor-
poration"); and Eric C. Christiansen, Exporting South Africa's Social Rights Jurisprndence, 5 
Loy. U. CHI. INT'L L. REv. 29, 41-43 (2007) [hereinafter Christiansen, Exporting Social 
Rights] (advocating the possibility of adoption by other countries). 
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I. PROTECTING SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA: Two 
PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS 
In order to assess whether the South African social rights jurisprudence 
offers an effective transnational tool to advance social justice, it is first ne-
cessary to examine two questions: (1) why examine social welfare rights as a 
potentially new solution to the historic problem of socio-economic inequali-
ty?; and (2) why look primarily to South Africa for guidance? The answers 
to those questions are closely interrelated. 
A. Why is Constitutional Protection o/Social Welfare Rights a New 
Solution? 
Social welfare rights are included in the text of most national constitu-
tions and their inclusion is not a recent phenomenon.4 They appeared in 
Western European constitutions following World War II, in Eastern Euro-
pean Constitutions after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and in post-colonial con-
stitutions in the years between and after those events.s But social welfare 
rights are infrequently enforced by courts. Indeed, constitutional law scho-
lars have largely contended that social rights are non-justiciable.6 Enforce-
ment of such rights by courts, they have asserted, is either impossible or un-
desirable because of democratic legitimacy issues and judicial competency 
issues.7 
The claimed legitimacy issues are related to the classic counter-
4 See Avi Ben-Bassat & Momi Dahan, Social Rights in the Constitution and in Practice, 36 J. 
OF COMPo ECON. 103, 103-119 (2008), available at 
http://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstracUd=407260 (surveying the inclusion of con-
stitutional commitments to social rights in 68 countries); Eric C. Christiansen, Survey of So-
cio-economic Rights in National Constitutions: Healthcare, Education, Social Security, Hous-
ing, Food and Water (Dec. 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter 
Christiansen, Survey of Socio-economic Rights]; Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-
Century Constitutions, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 519, 527-28 (1992); see also Wojciech Sadurski, 
Post-communist Charters of Rights in Europe and the U.S. Bill of Rights, 65 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 223 (2002). 
5 See HENRY J. STEINER, PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RiGHTS 
IN CONTEXT: LAW POLITICS MORALS 263-358 (3d ed. 2008). 
6 See Cecile Fabre, Constitutionalising Social Rights, 6 1. POL. PHIL. 263,264 (1998); Etienne 
Mureinik, Beyond a Charter of Luxuries: Economic Rights in the Constitution, 8 S. AFR. 1. 
HUM. RTS. 464, 465 (1992); Dennis M. Davis, The Case Against Inclusion ofSocio-Economic 
Demands in a Bill of Rights Except as Directive Principles, 8 S. AFR. 1. HUM. RTS. 475, 476-
78 (1992); Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare and the Forms of Judicial Review, 82 TEx. L. REv. 
1895, 1895-96 (2003-2004). 
7 See Fabre, supra note 6, at 280. 
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majoritarian difficulty of judicial review.8 How can decisions of an un-
elected branch of government overturn popular will as formulated by a de-
mocratically-elected legislative body? In the context of social rights adjudi-
cation, the traditional concerns about judicial review are exacerbated by the 
inherent policy-based and financial nature of the decisions the courts would 
have to make. A judgment that placed a positive duty upon or required sig-
nificant funding from the state, rather than merely a cessation of government 
activity, intrudes upon more non-judicial concerns than just the single issue 
before the court. This is the basis for the flawed but common description of 
socio-economic rights as "positive" rights in contrast to merely "negative" 
civil and political rights.9 Social rights are "positive" because they require 
affirmative actions and additional expenditures by the state, such as estab-
lishing and funding schools and providing teachers and materials for univer-
sal primary education. In contrast, "negative" rights merely prohibit certain 
government actions, such as state-sponsored discrimination in public 
schools. Only the latter sphere of "negative" rights are typically viewed as 
appropriate for a court to enforce. 
Judicial competency issues focus on problems related to the viability of 
courts as fora and the appropriateness of adjudication as a means for deter-
mining social welfare entitlements. These alleged failings include procedur-
al limitations, especially concerns about the suitability of any particular 
plaintiff to represent the general class of affected persons; informational 
problems, including the absence of the specialized, unbiased fact-finding 
available in a legislative setting; and remedy-related difficulties, particularly 
where the limited range of judicial remedies would be inadequate or politi-
cally inappropriate. 10 
8 The classic formulation of judicial review's counter-majoritarian difficulty is in ALEXANDER 
M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 
16-23 (2nd ed. 1986). The theory has also been expressly applied to socio-economic rights. 
See, e.g., Reynaud N. Daniels & Jason Brickhill, The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty and the 
South African Constitutional Court, 25 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 371 (2006). 
9 This distinction has been largely, and correctly, rejected. See Fabre, supra note 6, at 270-75; 
STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS ON 
TAXES (1999); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR's UNFINISHED 
REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT Now MORE THAN EVER (2004); see also Craig Scott & 
Patrick Macklem, Constitutional Ropes o/Sand or Justiciable Guarantees? Social Rights in a 
New South African Constitution, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1,48-71 (1992) (rejecting the negative-
positive distinction because the general notion of rights connotes positive and negative duties 
equally). 
\0 This organization draws upon Christiansen, Adjudicating Non-Justiciable Rights, supra 
note 3, at 349-53. 
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Underlying these arguments against justiciability was an even more in-
surmountable issue: social rights had never been adjudicated in an affirma-
tive and systematic way by a national court. II Historically, the most persua-
sive argument against comprehensive social rights adjudication was its 
radical novelty. The numerous justifications for opposition to judicial en-
forcement were routinely proposed without a single significant counter-
example as evidence to refute them. '2 Since there was no viable example of 
adjudication, critics were able to argue that adoption of such inherently un-
enforceable rights would warp the constitutional separation of powers, wea-
ken respect for the rule of law, bankrupt the nation, or lead to some other 
disaster. 13 Of course, such arguments ignored the harm caused to nations, 
their people, their government's legitimacy, and the rule of law by unad-
dressed socio-economic injustice. 
As a consequence, individual nations traditionally resolve the debate 
about constitutional socio-economic rights through one of only three consti-
tutional options: '4 1) exclusion from the constitutional text (rejecting such 
rights altogether on the basis of non-justiciability arguments);15 2) inclusion 
as a special category of unenforceable rights (typically in countries with little 
or no genuine judicial review);'6 or 3) inclusion as mere "directive prin-
ciples" for policy-making (including such rights only as judicially unenfor-
ceable policy statements ).17 Even where such rights have been expressly in-
cluded in constitutional text, these rights have been enforced to a very 
II STEINER, supra note 5, at 313-58 (considering arguments for and against adjudication of 
economic and social rights and looking at differences in how such rights are enforced in India, 
South Africa, the United States, and in European countries). 
121d. 
13 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, in WESTERN RIGHTS? POST-COMMUNIST 
ApPLICATION 225 (Andras Saj6 ed., 1996). 
14 Christiansen, Survey of Socio-economic Rights, supra note 4. See also Mark Tushnet, So-
cial Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review, 82 TEx. L. REV. 1895, 1897 (2003-
2004) (presenting three different ways of recognizing socio-economic rights by "enumerating 
them but making them nonjusticiable, making them justiciable but allowing the courts to find 
a constitutional violation only if the legislature has quite dramatically departed from what the 
constitution requires, and by making them enforceable to the same degree that traditional civil 
liberties and civil rights are"). 
15 See, e.g., Sun stein, supra note 13, at 225. 
16 See Tushnet, supra note 14, at 1898-1902. 
17 See, e.g., INDIA CONST. pt. IV, art. 37 ("The provisions contained in this Part shall not be 
enforceable by any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in 
the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in 
making laws."). 
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limited degree. 18 Hence, constitutional enforcement of social rights is a new 
tool to combat social injustice because it is a tool that has previously been 
unavailable to courts or available but unused. 
South Africa's post-apartheid Constitution introduced a fourth approach 
to the problem of constitutional recognition of socio-economic rights. South 
Africa, evidently more concerned with the need to address the radical in-
equality of the apartheid period than about theoretical harms to the rule of 
law, adopted extensive social welfare provisions in its Constitution, deter-
mined that these rights are enforceable by courts, and adjudicated claims 
based on the Constitution's social welfare rights. It is only as a consequence 
of this South African constitutional adjudication that the long-missing coun-
ter-example is now available to refute the dire predictions of social rights 
opponents. South Africa, alone among modem constitutional democracies, 
has used the tool of constitutional social rights in a manner that permits 
evaluation of the capacity of courts to advance socio-economic justice 
through such adjudication. 
B. Why South Africa? 
South Africa is uniquely situated to provide insight and permit assess-
ment of the possibility of courts advancing social justice. Social welfare 
provisions were enumerated in the 1994 Interim Constitution and expanded 
18 For example, in the United States, although social welfare rights are enshrined in many 
state constitutions, they are not generally enforced. See Sarah Ramsey & Daan Braveman, 
"Let Them Starve": Government's Obligation to Children in Poverty, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1607, 
1628 (1995) (discussing the state courts' reliance on highly deferential federal standards in 
interpreting distinctive state constitutional welfare clauses); Helen Hershkoff, Rights and 
Freedoms under the State Constitution: A New Deal for Welfare Rights, 13 TOURO L. REv. 
631, 640 (1997) (finding that although the New York courts will occasionally review ques-
tions of exclusion, it takes a "hands-off approach to questions of adequacy, on the view that 
these involve choices best left to the electoral process"). Similarly, the Irish Constitution 
enumerates a list of social welfare rights, but exempts them from judicial enforcement. IR. 
CONST., 1937, art. 45, § 1 ("The principles of social policy set forth in this Article are in-
tended for the general guidance .... The application of those principles ... shall not be cognis-
able by any Court under any of the provisions of this Constitution."). The Indian Constitution 
includes a list of social welfare rights under the heading "Directive Principles of State Poli-
cy," but also makes those rights judicially unenforceable. See INDIA CON ST. pt. IV, art. 37. 
However, India is a rare case where the Supreme Court has made some advances in terms of 
socio-economic rights, even though they are not explicitly enforceable rights under the Indian 
Constitution. See, e.g., Olga Tellis v. Bombay Mun. Corp., (1985) 2 S.C.R. Sup\. 51 (holding 
that the right to life and liberty included the directive principle right to livelihood and thereby 
requiring that pavement dwellers be provided with alternative accommodation before evic-
tion). 
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in the 1997 Constitution. 19 In the In Re: Certification case and other early 
cases, the Court directly addressed traditional non-justiciability arguments 
and ruled that social rights were enforceable?O Since it began hearing cases 
in 1995,11 the courts of South Africa have heard-and affirmatively ruled 
on-numerous challenges to laws and governmental policies and actions that 
allegedly violated the social welfare provisions ofthe Constitution. 
South Africa is the first nation that has adjudicated a sufficient number 
of cases to evidence a comprehensive jurisprudence. The judiciary has used 
traditional court procedures within the structure of its regular judicial system 
to enforce socio-economic rights through readily recognizable processes. 
The current South African jurisprudence is a direct refutation of the tradi-
tional claims of dire consequences from judicial enforcement of socio-
economic protections. Indeed, the Court has been criticized far more for the 
excessive restraint it has shown than for judicial over-reaching?Z Of course, 
19 Conflict between the ruling white minority government and the ANC resulted in a two-
stage constitutional drafting process with a newly-formed Constitutional Court enforcing the 
parties' negotiated agreement. The first stage involved drafting a preliminary Constitution (the 
1994 Interim Constitution), holding fully democratic elections and setting up a new Parlia-
ment that would choose a new president. The second stage gave the task of crafting the final 
constitution (the 1997 Constitution) to the newly elected Parliament and Senate in their role as 
the Constitutional Assembly. Two safeguards linked the two stages of the process: a set of 
thirty-four inviolable constitutional principles (known as the Thirty-four Principles) estab-
lished by the initial negotiating parties to constrict the subsequent, final constitution and a 
constitutional court appointed under the Interim Constitution with the task of certifying that 
the final Constitution did not violate any of the Thirty-four Principles. ALLISTER SPARKS, 
TOMORROW IS ANOTHER COUNTRY: THE INSIDE STORY OF SOUTH AFRICA'S ROAD TO CHANGE 
129 (1995); PATTI WALDMEIR, ANATOMY OF A MIRACLE 194-95 (1997); Albie Sachs, South 
Africa's Unconstitutional Constitution: The Transition From Power To Lawful Power, 41 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 1249, 1255 (1997); Jeremy Sarkin, Innovations in the Interim and 1996 South 
African Constitutions, 60 THE REv. 57 (June 1998). 
20 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) paras. 1-19,76-78 (S. Afr.), available 
at http://www. 
constitutionalcourt.org.zaI Archimages/3626.PDF [hereinafter In re: Certification of the South 
African Constitution]. This and all Constitutional Court decisions are available at the official 
website of the Constitutional Court, http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za. 
21 The first case heard by the Court was on February 15, 1995. State v. T Makwanyane and M 
Mchunu 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) (S. Afr.), available at 
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.zalArchimages/2353.PDF (declaring the death penalty to 
be inconsistent with the Constitution) 
22 For criticism of the South African Constitutional Court's socio-economic rights jurispru-
dence, see David Bilchitz, Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core: Laying the 
Foundations for Future Socioeconomic Rights Jurisprudence, 19 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 1 
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active enforcement of rights is different from successful judicial advance-
ment of social justice, but it is certainly a threshold requirement. 
I.Enumeration of Rights to Social Welfare 
As with everything in the South African Constitution-making process, 
inclusion of social welfare rights must be understood in historical context: 
generally, the end of apartheid, and, specifically, the constitutional negotia-
tions in the early 1990s between the African National Congress ("ANC") 
and the white-minority ruling government. 
The impetus, if not necessity, to include social welfare rights in South 
Africa's first democratic constitution was a result of the role socio-economic 
oppression played within the larger context of apartheid's system of political 
and social sUbjugation.23 As ANC negotiator Kader Asmal stated in the de-
bates about the constitutional text, "[t]he struggle for liberation in South 
Africa ... has always been a struggle for freedom from hunger, poverty, 
landlessness, and homelessness. Our Bill of Rights must reflect ... the mul-
tidimensional and all-encompassing nature of the struggle for liberation.,,24 
Starting with the Freedom Charter, the original anti-apartheid manifesto 
crafted in 1955, social welfare was inextricably linked to the goal of post-
apartheid liberation.25 The early constitutional proposals and public state-
(2003) (criticizing the jurisprudential foundations of the Constitutional Court in socio-
economic rights cases); Theunis Roux, Understanding Grootboom - A Response to Cass R. 
Sunstein, 12 CONST. F. 41 (2002) (arguing that Grootboom does not adequately explain the 
extent to which the government must prioritize the needs of the poor and finding that the 
Court's remedy was deficient); Dennis Davis, Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: The 
Record After Ten Years, 2 N.Z. J. OF PUB. & INT'L L. 47 (2004) (the author, a Cape High 
Court judge, disapproving of the Court's judgments for excessive deference to government). 
But see Mark S. Kende, The South African Constitutional Court's Construction of Socio-
economic Rights: A Response to Critics, 19 CONN. 1. INT'L L. 617, 624 (2004) (finding many 
of the criticisms of the Court to be unwarranted). 
23 Apartheid dictated a policy of separation with only the pretense of equality, theoretically 
guided by the development needs of the "inferior races" but in fact effecting a tremendous 
socio-economic advantage to whites. See FRANK WELSH, A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA 414-
99 (2000). 
24 Republic of South Africa, DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY: 24 January to 20 
February 1995, at 122-23 (1994-96). 
25 On socio-economic topics, the Freedom Charter declared: 
Education shall be free, compulsory, universal and equal for all children .... 
All people shall have the right to ... be decently housed, and to bring up their 
families in comfort and security ... [N]o-one shall go hungry; [and] Free medi-
cal care and hospitalisation shall be provided for all, with special care for moth-
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ments reflected the interrelated nature of political equality and social wel-
fare. By the time the formal negotiations began regarding the provisions of 
the post-apartheid constitution, the goal to include socio-economic rights 
was a consistent ANC position.26 Opposition to the inclusion of social wel-
fare rights in the formal constitutional drafting process came from the apar-
theid government represented by the National Party. For the National Party, 
inclusion of social welfare rights threatened the system of white and Afri-
kaner socio-economic privilege that existed under apartheid.27 
Because of the strength of the ruling government's bargaining position, 
only very limited social welfare rights, such as basic education and mini-
mum welfare for children, were included in the 1994 Interim Constitution.28 
ers and young children ... 
Freedom Charter, Congress of the People, June 26, 1955, African National Congress Histori-
cal Document Archive, http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/charter.html (last visited Jan. 
27,2009). 
26 In 1992, the ANC produced Ready to Govern, which identified the ANC's clear intention to 
include affirmative provisions related to socio-economic rights: 
The Bill of Rights will affirm the right of all persons to have access to basic 
educational, health and welfare services. It will establish principles and mechan-
isms to ensure that there is an enforceable and expanding minimum floor of en-
titlements for all, in the areas of education, health and welfare. It will commit the 
courts to take into account the need to reduce malnutrition, unemployment and 
homelessness when making any decisions. . .. Special agencies linked to Par-
liament and the courts should be set up so as to ensure that national, regional and 
local authorities apply appropriate shares of their budgets to achieving these 
rights, taking into account the problems oflimited resources and affordability. 
African National Congress, Ready to Govern: ANC policy guidelines for a democratic South 
Africa adopted at the National Conference (1992), 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/readyto.html (last visited Jan. 18,2009). 
27 See WELSH, supra note 23, at 463-99 (describing how the system of apartheid preserved 
socio-economic privilege for white South Africans, especially Afrikaners); see also LOURENS 
DU PLESSIS & HUGH CORDER, UNDERSTANDING SOUTH AFRICA'S TRANSITIONAL BILL OF 
RIGHTS 32 (1994) (stating that the ruling white minority party feared dramatic change in the 
economic status quo). 
28 S. AFR. (lNTERIM) CONST. 1993, ch.3: 
§ 32 Education 
Every person shall have the right-
(a) to basic education and to equal access to educational institutions; 
(b) to instruction in the language of his or her choice where this is reasonably 
practicable; and 
(c) to establish, where practicable, educational institutions based on a common 
culture, language or religion, provided that there shall be no discrimination on 
the ground of race. 
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However, when the ANC achieved political dominance through the popular 
elections in April 1994, its representatives in the Constitutional Assembly 
were able to include a panoply of social welfare protections in the draft of 
the final Constitution. The final Constitution/9 passed by the requisite ma-
jority of the Assembly and signed by President Nelson Mandela on Decem-
ber 10, 1996, included extensive socio-economic rights. 3o The Constitution 
§ 30 Children 
(1) Every child shall have the right-
(a) to a name and nationality as from birth; 
(b) to parental care; 
( c) to security, basic nutrition and basic health and social services; 
(d) not to be subject to neglect or abuse; and 
(e) not to be subject to exploitative labour practices nor to be required or permit-
ted to perform work which is hazardous or harmful to his or her education, 
health or well-being. 
(2) Every child who is in detention shall, in addition to the rights which he or she 
has in terms of section 25, have the right to be detained under conditions and to 
be treated in a manner that takes account of his or her age. 
(3) For the purpose of this section a child shall mean a person under the age of 
18 years and in all matters concerning such child his or her best interest shall be 
paramount. 
29 At the time of the constitutional drafting process in South Africa the two versions of the 
constitution were known at the Interim Constitution (the constitution that ended the party-
based negotiations, ended apartheid, and allowed democratic elections in South Africa in 
1994) and the Final Constitution (based on and subject to limits in the Interim Constitution 
but formally drafted by the Constitutional Assembly in the two years following the April 1994 
elections). See In re: Certification o/the South African Constitution, supra note 20, paras. 1-
21. 
30 S. AFR. CON ST. 1996, ch. 2. The core social rights included in the South African Bill of 
Rights include: 
§ 26 Housing 
(l) Everyone has the right to haves access to adequate housing. 
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right. 
§ 27 Health care, food, water and social security 
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to-
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care; 
(b) sufficient food and water; and 
(c) social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their 
dependants, appropriate social assistance. 
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights. 
(3) No one may be refused emergency medical treatment. 
§ 29 Education 
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eventually went into effect on February 4, 1997.31 
However, before the final Constitution could come into force, all of its 
provisions had to be certified by the Constitutional Court as compliant with 
the 1993 negotiated agreements. 32 Inclusion of social rights was contested 
during this process. Opponents argued that such rights were inherently non-
justiciable, were not "universally recognized fundamental rights" (as re-
quired by the negotiated agreement), and that inclusion of such rights vi-
olated the constitutionally-mandated separation of powers. 33 All of these ar-
guments were rejected in the 1996 Constitutional Court decision In Re: 
(1) Everyone has the right-
(a) to a basic education, including adult basic education; and 
(b) to further education, which the state, through reasonable measures, must 
make progressively available and accessible. 
Additional socio-economic rights can be found in the South African Constitution in ch. 2, § 
23 (labor relations), § 25 (property rights and land reform), § 28 (children's rights to, inter 
alia, "basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services"), § 35 (detainee'S 
rights to, inter alia, "adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading material and medical treat-
ment"). 
31 See Const. Ct. ofS. Afr., The Constitution: The Certification Process, 
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/theconstitution/thecertificationprocess.htm (last 
visited May 15,2009); In re: Certification of the South African Constitution, supra note 20, at 
paras. 6-14. 
32 The proposed final Constitution had to be certified by the Court to ensure that none of its 
provisions conflicted with the Thirty-four Principles in the Interim Constitution. See S. AFR. 
(Interim) CON ST. 1993, sched. 4. The initial review by the Constitutional Court found that 
"we ultimately come to the conclusion that the [proposed text] cannot be certified as it stands 
because there are several respects in which there has been non-compliance with the [Thirty-
four Principles]," but also noted that, "in general and in respect of the overwhelming majority 
of its provisions, the [Constitutional Assembly] has attained [its] goal." In re Certification of 
the South African Constitution, supra note 20, at para. 31. Certification of the subsequently 
amended text was granted by the full court in Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional As-
sembly: In re Certification of the amended text of the Const. of the Rep. ofS. Afr. 1996, 1997 
(2) SA 97 (CC), at para. 205 (S. Afr.). 
33 The opposition groups included the South African Institute for Race Relations (an organiza-
tion supporting 'economic liberalism'), the Free Market Foundation, and the Gauteng Associ-
ation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry. See In re: Certification of the South African 
Constitution, supra note 20, at paras. 76-78; Sandra Liebenberg, South Africa's Evolving Juri-
sprudence on Socio-Economic Rights: An Effective Tool in Challenging Poverty?, 6 L. 
DEMOCRACY & DEY. 159, 160 n.ll (2002), available at 
http://www.communitylawcentre.org.zalSocio-Economic-Rights/research-projectl2002-vol-6-
law-democracy-and-developmentlliebenberg-12-march.pdfl. For a report of some of the 
Court's discussion of the certification question as it relates to socio-economic rights, see THE 
POST-APARTHEID CONSTITUTIONS: PERSPECTIVES ON SOUTH AFRICA'S BASIC LAW 408-09 (Pe-
nelope Andrews & Stephen EHmann eds., 2001). 
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Certification of the South African Constitution.34 As a result, the core social 
welfare rights of access to adequate housing, healthcare, food, water, social 
security, and education were expressly included in the final, certified text of 
the South African Constitution.35 
The right of access to adequate housing presents the typical textual for-
mulation of such rights; the declaration of the right is accompanied by tex-
tual limitations related to "available resources" and "progressive realiza-
tion." Section 26 provides that: "(1) Everyone has the right to have access to 
adequate housing. (2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other 
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisa-
tion of this right. ,,36 
The issue of inclusion was settled affirmatively in the final proposed 
text of the Constitution and in the In Re Certification decision, and the issue 
of justiciability was addressed in the Court's earliest cases. What remained 
for the Court was to craft a coherent jurisprudence of social welfare rights in 
actual cases. 
2. Social Rights Case Law 
The Court has addressed the Constitution's social rights provisions in 
numerous cases, but the core of its substantive jurisprudence has typically 
been identified from three fundamental cases: Soobramoney, Grootboom, 
and Treatment Action Campaign ("TAC,,}.37 These initial cases established 
how the Court will evaluate constitutional claims under socio-economic 
rights, with more recent cases expanding and clarifying the full capacity of 
courts as remedial bodies in the area of socio-economic injustice.38 
In Soobramoney, the Constitutional Court faced a challenge to an estab-
34Jn re: Certification of the South African Constitution, supra note 20, at paras. 77-78. 
35 Jd. 
36 S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 2, § 26. 
37 These core cases are discussed infra. Other important cases include President of the Repub-
lic of South Africa & Others v. Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd & Others 2004 CCT 20/04 
(right to housing); Minister of Pub. Works & Others v. Kyalami Ridge Envtl. Ass 'n & Others 
2001 (3) SA 1151 (CC) (S. Afr.) (right to housing, right to property, rights of ownership), 
available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2001l19.pdf; and Khosa & Others v. Minis-
ter of Soc. Dev. & Others 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) (S. Afr.) (right of access to social security), 
available at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/1344.PDF. 
38 Occupiers of 5 J Olivia Road Berea Twp. and 197 Main St. Johannesburg v. City of Johan-
nesburg & Others 2008 (3) SA 208 (S. Afr.), available at 
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/ArchirnagesI11581.02.08.PDF [hereinafter Berea 
Township]. 
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lished hospital policy prioritizing access to dialysis treatments. 39 A termi-
nally ill patient excluded by the policy from life-sustaining treatment sued 
under Section 27, the right of access to healthcare, and other provisions. The 
Court affirmed the judicial enforceability of social rights but held that nei-
ther the right of access to healthcare nor the right to emergency medical 
treatment required the Court to overturn the otherwise reasonable medical 
decisions of doctors and administrators faced with limited financial re-
sources.40 
The Grootboom case addressed the right to housing for squatters in an 
informal settlement outside Capetown.41 Ms. Irene Grootboom, along with 
510 children and 389 other adults, made a claim under Section 26, the right 
of access to adequate housing, and Section 28, the rights of children, seeking 
provision of adequate housing for adults and children pending permanent ac-
commodation.42 The Court concluded that governmental housing programs 
violated the Constitution by failing to develop and implement a "comprehen-
sive and coordinated programme" to advance a constitutional right; particu-
larly programs that failed to address the housing needs of people "with no 
access to land, no roof over their heads, and who were living in intolerable 
conditions or crisis situations.',43 The order issued by the Court required the 
government to remedy the program's failings, and assigned the Human 
Rights Commission, an independent national body, to monitor and report on 
the status of the changes.44 
In the TA C case, the Court declared unconstitutional a government pro-
gram that restricted distribution of medication that dramatically decreased 
the likelihood of mother-to-child transmission of Human Immunodeficiency 
Virus ("HIV,,).45 The Court ordered the government to "implement within 
its available resources a comprehensive and coordinated programme" to ad-
39 Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) (S. Afr.), avail-
able at http://www.constitutiona\court.org.zaJArchimages/1617 .PDF [hereinafter Soobramo-
ney]. 
40Id. at para. 36. 
41 Gov't of the Republic of S. Afr. v. Grootboom & Others, 2001 (I) SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.), 
available at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.zalArchimages/2798.PDF [hereinafter Groot-
boom]. 
42 Id. at paras. 7-13. 
43Id. at para. 99. 
44Id. at paras. 97-99. 
45 Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign & Others (No.2), 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) 
(S. Afr.), available at http://www.constitutiona\court.org.zalArchimagesI2378.PDF [hereinaf-
ter TAC]. 
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dress HN transmission issues.46 It also ruled that the government must: de-
vise a program that includes reasonable measures for counseling and testing 
pregnant women for HN, immediately remove the restrictions that pre-
vented the medication from being distributed widely, and "permit and facili-
tate" the use of such medication for the purpose of reducing the transmission 
ofHN.47 
In addition to these core judgments, the Constitutional Court very re-
cently decided Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road Berea Township v. City of Jo-
hannesburg, a case that may have even more practical effect.48 The plain-
tiffs sought to halt otherwise legal government evictions of people residing 
in unsafe buildings in Johannesburg. The Court held that the comprehensive 
program requirement announced in Grootboom and TAC must include a 
meaningful process of engagement with the affected community.49 Berea 
Township further limited the government's capacity to evict legal and illegal 
residents unless a "good faith" negotiation and consultation process had oc-
curred and allowance had been made for the homelessness that could result 
from the action. 50 
In general, these and other social rights cases51 affirm that, although the 
"obligations imposed on the state . . . are dependent upon the resources 
available for such purposes,,,52 the Court will require creation of a broad pol-
icy-based program with particular attention paid to those who are most vul-
46 Id. at para. 135. 
47 Id. at para. 135. 
48 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v. City of 
Johannesburg & Others (No. CCT 24/07) (2008) ZACC 1 (S. Afr.), available at 
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/ArchimagesIl1581.02.08.PDF [hereinafter Berea 
Township]. 
49 Id. at para. 16 
50 I d. at paras. 20-22. 
51 See, e.g., Jaftha v. Schoeman 2004 (2) SA 140 (CC) (S. Afr.), available at 
http://www.constitutionaicourt.org.za!Archimages/2336.PDF (concluding a lack of judicial 
oversight for a debt-related forced home sale was an unconstitutional violation of Section 26); 
Khosa v. Minister of Soc. Dev. 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) (S. Afr.) (finding that denial of social 
welfare benefits to non-citizen permanent residents was unreasonable and violated the rights 
to both equality and social security), available at 
http://www.constitutionaicourt.org.za!Archimages/1344.PDF. For a summary discussion of 
the most judgments (including lower court judgments) related to socio-economic rights, see 
The Socio-Economic Rights Project of the Community Law Centre's Case Reviews, 
http://www.communitylawcentre.org.zaIProjects/Socio-Economic-Rights/case-reviews-
l/south-african-cases. 
52 Soobramoney, supra note 39, at para. 11 (Ngcobo dissent). 
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nerable.53 The Court will also require implementation that includes "all rea-
sonable steps necessary to initiate and sustain" a successful program to 
advance the asserted right,54 including "meaningful engagement" with those 
whose social welfare rights are most impacted. 55 
3. Court-Imposed Limits 
However, this portrayal of the Court's jurisprudence tells only one part 
of the story. In addition to the relatively affIrmative elements of the juri-
sprudence described above, there are also a host of self-imposed limits in the 
Court's rulings. The most obvious examples are the Court's avoidance of in-
dividual remedies, its unwillingness to recognize unqualified textual rights, 
and its rejection of a "minimum core" standard for social welfare entitle-
ments. 
The Court has granted an individual remedy in just a single, rather atyp-
ical case,56 and has otherwise refrained from issuing orders directly benefit-
ing the parties bringing claims. In the Njongi case, the Court addressed in-
defensible bureaucratic action against Ms. Deliwe Muriel Njongi, a destitute 
disabled woman who lost her only source of income when the Department of 
Welfare for the Eastern Cape denied continuation of her disability grant, ap-
parently at random and without notice.57 In its ruling, the Court rejected the 
Department's statute of limitations defense because the state's decision to 
claim the defense failed to take into account Ms. Njongi's poverty and other 
circumstances.58 Njongi is an exceptional case, however, as is evident in the 
Court's use of particularly strong language to describe the state action as 
"grossly insulting," "absurd," and "devoid of all humanity.,,59 
Far more typical of the Court's remedies is Grootboom, where the Court 
declared the Western Cape's housing program unconstitutional but issued an 
order that brought no immediate or direct relief to Irene Grootboom or the 
other plaintiffs.60 Typically, the Court has focused on dissatisfaction with 
53 Grootboom, supra note 41, at para. 67. 
54 Grootboom, supra note 41, at para. 67. 
55 Berea Township, supra note 48, at para. 18. 
56 Njongi v. Member of the Executive Council, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape, (No. 
CCT 37/07) (2008) ZACC 4 (S. Afr.), available at 
www.constitutionalcourt.org.zalArchimages/11953.PDF [hereinafter Njongll. 
57 Id. at para. 3-27. 
58 Id. at para. 80-92. 
59 Id. at para. 85-90. 
60 See Grootboom, supra note 41, at para. 99. See Kameshni Pillay, Implementing Groo/-
boom: Supervision Needed, 3 ESR REv. 11 (2002), available at http://www.escr-
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governmental programs or governmental action; placing the burden upon the 
government to improve its programs, generally without reference to the par-
ties who advanced the claims to the Court. The Court's remedial orders es-
sentially tell the government to do better, rather than ensuring any immediate 
improvement for the complainant. 
Additionally, the Court has ignored the textual distinctiveness of the un-
limited rights in the Constitution; rights without an internal limitations 
clause related to "progressive realization" and "available resources.,,61 For 
example, the Court has treated the unqualified textual rights to minimal so-
cial services for children as if they granted no greater protections than other 
social welfare provisions.62 Similarly, despite the use of ensured minimum 
social welfare entitlements in international law, the Court has rejected the 
adoption of such "minimum core" standards.63 
These judicially-imposed limits have been the basis for some of the 
strong criticism of the Court's jurisprudence.64 The result is that even with-
out clear constitutional guidance, the Court at present has chosen a some-
what cautious middle position for its jurisprudence, encompassing legislative 
deference, a reasonableness standard, and rejection of any form of unre-
stricted enforcement. While such jurisprudence is far more defensible 
against the arguments of those opposed to social rights enforcement, it is 
notably less satisfYing to those who expected enforcement of social welfare 
net.orglusr _ doclKameshni_ Pillay _ -_ lmplementing_ Grootboom.doc; see also Lucie White, 
African Lawyers Harness Human Rights to Face Down Global Poverty, 60 ME. L. REv. 165, 
170-71 (2008) (describing Ms. Grootboom's post-trial frustration). 
61 The internal limitations clause (so-called to distinguish it from the Chapter 36 Limitations 
Clause, which applies to all rights in the Bill of Rights) is present in nearly all of the social 
welfare rights in the Constitution. For example, in the provisions regarding housing, it states: 
"The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, 
to achieve the progressive realisation of this right." S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 2, § 26(2). 
62 Grootboom, supra note 41, at para. 74. 
63 Minimum core analysis, used by the United Nations International Committee on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"), in its non-binding general comments and concluding 
observations on nation reports under the leESCR, attempts to "ensure the satisfaction of, at 
the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights" by state parties to the lCESCR. 
U.N. Off. of the High Comm'r for Hum. Rts., Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, 
General Comment 3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations, § 10, U.N. Doc. EII991/23 
(Dec. 14, 1990). See Sandra Liebenberg, The Interpretation of Socio-Economic Rights, in 2 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA §33.2(a), n.3 at 33-3, §33.5(e) at 33-22 (Matthew 
Chaskalson et al. eds., 2d ed. 2004) (providing a discussion about the Court's rejection of min-
imum core obligations analysis and a review of the critiques of that position). 
64 These self-imposed limits are also evidence of the process of differentiated incorporation as 
discussed in Part II, infra. See Davis, supra note 22. 
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rights to dramatically advance social justice in post-apartheid South Africa. 
II. EXPORTING THE SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIAL RIGHTS MODEL 
An obvious pre-condition for constitutional enforcement of social wel-
fare rights was a judicial response to the varied and dominant non-
justiciability arguments. The arguments that constitutional protection of so-
cio-economic rights would be harmful to a nation had to be confronted, as-
sessed, and addressed. Because of the unique approach of the South African 
Constitutional Court, South Africa not only justified its own affIrmative juri-
sprudence but it also created a model for other nations wishing to judicially 
enforce social rights. Because of South Africa, an additional viable option is 
available for such nations other than exclusion of such rights, unenforceable 
inclusion, or inclusion as mere directive principles.65 South Africa offers a 
fourth alternative: inclusion with enforceability through differentiated incor-
poration. 
A. The Question of Exportabi/ity 
The South African social rights jurisprudence can be offered up as a 
model for other countries to adopt or emulate only if it is "exportable," that 
is, if it is capable of application outside the particular milieu of South Africa. 
This is an important issue because the inclusion of socio-economic protec-
tions in the Constitution was a result of the unique history of South Africa. 
For most South Africans, an end to apartheid required an end to the radical 
economic disparity of the past; political equality was both an end in itself 
and a means to equality of access, advantage, and opportunity.66 To the ex-
tent the radical socio-economic inequality of apartheid resulted in inclusion 
of enumerated social rights in the final South African Constitution, it could 
be argued that such rights cannot be effectively exported to countries with a 
different history. 
It is true that historical need and popular expectations applied substan-
tial pressure on the drafters of the Constitution. However, that is the nature 
of constitutional drafting processes generally, not just in South Africa. 
There is no reason to assume similar pressures for improved socio-economic 
65 See discussion supra this article, at 5, text accompanying n. 14-17. 
66 3 DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY, Rep. of S. Afr., 122-23 (1996) (ANC 
member Kader Asmal said, "The struggle for liberation in South Africa was not only a strug-
gle for the right to vote, to move, to marry, or to love. It has always been a struggle for free-
dom from hunger, poverty, landlessness, and homelessness."); Soobramoney, supra note 39, 
at para. 8. 
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conditions will not be, or have not been, frequent motivations for political 
change through constitutional processes in many countries. But there is 
every reason to believe that constitutional drafting procedures which result 
in enumerated and ostensibly enforceable social rights are motivated by very 
similar popular, political, or moral concerns.67 Similar constitutional com-
mitments may grow out of distinctive histories. 
As described in detail below, the unique but adaptable manner in which 
the South African Constitutional Court's social rights jurisprudence accom-
modated classic non-justiciability arguments gives rise to an exportable 
model of social rights enforcement. 
B. Differentiated Incorporation 
In order to craft its socio-economic rights jurisprudence, the South Afri-
can Constitutional Court needed to determine how a judicial body could best 
interpret and enforce such rights. This assessment required the Court to con-
front the long-standing arguments against the justiciability of socio-
economic rights. The Court implicitly and explicitly evaluated the various 
theoretical arguments against social rights adjudication, disregarded the con-
cerns that were inapt under its unique Constitution and history, and then 
crafted a jurisprudence that accounted for and incorporated the surviving 
criticisms in its enforcement.68 
This model is "differentiated incorporation" because it differentiates be-
tween valid and invalid critiques of social rights adjudication and then incor-
porates the legitimate concerns into a jurisprudence that differs from politi-
cal rights jurisprudence only as necessary to accommodate the surviving 
concerns. The result is an exportable model for social rights adjudication: a 
country-specific jurisprudence that accommodates valid justiciability con-
cerns through domestically-appropriate processes.69 Each step of this 
process must be tailored to the particular country by its courts. While a simi-
lar collection of theoretical opposing arguments will generally be considered 
at the start of the differentiation stage, there will inevitably be concerns or 
emphases unique to the adopting country, derivative of its particular history 
or legal culture. The judiciary must examine each non-justiciability argu-
ment in relation to its own constitutional text and culture. Issues that will 
67 Mark Tushnet, Some Skepticism About Normative Constitutional Advice, 49 WM. & MARY 
L. REv. 1473, 1478 (2008). 
68 The concept of differentiated incorporation was first presented by the author in another ar-
ticle; see Christiansen, Adjudicating Non-Justiciable Rights, supra note 3, at 377-84. 
69 Christiansen, Exporting Social Rights, supra note 3, at 41-43. 
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impact this analysis include the constitution's text (especially the claimed 
social rights provisions), the approach to rights adjudication generally, sepa-
ration of power issues, federalism issues (where applicable), legal culture, 
the capability and credibility of the judiciary, procedural issues that impact 
the courts' capacity to solicit information, and the breadth and flexibility of 
the courts' remedial powers. 
This discussion of a foreign nation's adoption of differentiated incorpo-
ration focuses on the South African model for determination of an appropri-
ate jurisprudence, rather than on South African textual rights and case law. 
The model is exportable because the courts of other nations can explicitly 
follow the process implicit in the South African Constitutional Court's ap-
proach. A different court interpreting a new constitution or a newly-
amended constitution that includes social welfare rights as enforceable pro-
visions can evaluate the range of historical arguments against adjudication of 
socio-economic rights, discard those arguments that are invalid or inapt in 
that country's particular constitutional culture and then craft a social rights 
jurisprudence that expressly addresses the remaining, legitimate concerns. 70 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT AS A TOOL FOR SOCIAL 
JUSTICE 
While the process of differentiated incorporation may allow courts to 
enforce socio-economic rights in a useful and appropriate manner, it does 
not speak to the capacity of such adjudication to rectify social injustice. 
Have the South African courts contributed to positive social change? A re-
view of changing socio-economic conditions in South Africa highlights the 
need to ask a nuanced question about judicial contributions, thus ensuring 
expectations are modest and consistent with the role of judges. The South 
African experience will then help identify reasonable expectations of courts 
generally when they adjudicate social welfare rights. The result is an initial 
list of ways in which constitutional adjudication may be used to advance so-
cial justice. 
A. The Constitutional Meaning of Persistent Socio-economic Inequality 
Any evaluation of the aptitude of South African courts to advance social 
justice must account for the current socio-economic situation in the country. 
South Africa remains troubled by substantial poverty and inadequate social 
welfare protection. Inclusion of constitutional rights related to housing, 
70 See id. 
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healthcare, education, and other social necessities has not resulted in a nation 
that satisfies all of its citizens' social welfare needs. The disparity between 
protecting socio-economic rights and adequately providing social welfare 
must be explored. Is the gulf between the Constitution's promise and the 
people's needs remedied or lessened by the enforcement of enumerated so-
cial welfare rights? 
1. The Necessity of Assessment 
Why is it necessary to closely evaluate the capacity of constitutional 
rights enforcement to advance social justice? Is it not enough that it might 
work? In the absence of other new and promising solutions to the problem 
of persistent economic inequality, should advocates not pursue all reasonable 
means? Although there is some merit to that argument, two relevant pieces 
of conventional wisdom seem self-evidently true and argue for a careful 
analysis. First, court enforcement of social welfare rights cannot be suffi-
cient alone to accomplish substantial realization of a socially just society. 
Second, prioritizing adjudication to the detriment of political action and 
popular organizing works against the ultimate goal of social transformation. 
These insights counsel for a cautious, or at least, informed, approach to a ju-
dicially-focused strategy for social change. 
a. Institutional insufficiency 
The first point of conventional wisdom highlights the institutional 
weaknesses of the judiciary. At a practical level the courts need the bureau-
cracy of the state to implement any significant change. At a theoretical lev-
el, a court's role as interpreter of the laws cannot possibly include sufficient 
power to effectuate significant social change in the absence of, or in opposi-
tion to, the other branches of government. 71 Nearly all rights-based court or-
ders are effectuated through the political branches; purely pragmatic reasons 
require such a system. Establishing effective bureaucratic responses requires 
specialized knowledge of systems of delivery, related and impacted services, 
and local conditions. It also requires a capacity to effectively and promptly 
investigate relevant issues and resolve newly arising challenges. The 
nuanced approach necessary to successfully address social welfare and craft 
systems to meet such needs exceeds the capability ofjudges.72 
71 Obviously, few social welfare issues are likely to reach the courts where the other branches 
are in agreement with the courts' opinion. Presumably, those concerns would be addressed by 
legislation or policies that serve those concerns. 
72 It should not be surprising that this concern about competency mirrors one of the justicia-
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Moreover, judicial rulings and the limited array of court remedies are an 
inefficient way to address governmental disinterest or opposition to social 
welfare concerns. Courts do not have the tools to force an obdurate govern-
ment to comply with their will in a constitutional democracy; only the elec-
torate possesses such power. In addition, changing public opinion in order 
to apply pressure to governments is also not a strength of courts. 73 This is 
true even in the context of South Africa, which possesses a separation of 
powers scheme that strongly empowers the judiciary in relation to the other 
branches.74 
b. Prioritizing strategies for social change 
Litigation is a resource- and labor-intensive undertaking and its capacity 
for social transformation is weakest when the court acts at odds with popular 
opinion.75 Furthermore, litigation does not occur spontaneously nor do 
courts act of their own volition. Necessarily, if courts enforce social welfare 
rights, they do so in response to claims brought by extra-judicial parties.76 
bility concerns that survived the differentiated incorporation process. Differentiated incorpo-
ration highlights the legitimate limits on the judicial role as much as it discards the illegiti-
mate ones. See supra this article, at Part II.B. 
73 GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 
(Univ. of Chicago Press 1991) (arguing that judicial capacity for social change is limited). See 
generally LEVERAGING THE LAW: USING THE COURTS TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL CHANGE (David A. 
Schultz ed., Peter Lang 1998) [hereinafter LEVERAGING THE LAW] (discussing a variety of 
critical responses to the Hollow Hope thesis). See also Thomas R. Marshall, American Public 
Opinion and the Rehnquist Court, 89 JUDICATURE 177 (2005) (using surveys to demonstrate a 
general convergence of public opinion and Supreme Court rulings). 
74 Eric C. Christiansen, Essay: An Appropriately Activist Court: South African Constitutional 
Court Rights Jurisprudence, 1995-2001, 30-34 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the au-
thor) [hereinafter An Appropriately Activist Court). And, there is reason to believe these insti-
tutional weaknesses are appropriate. If courts had the capacity to remedy a problem as 
enormous and important as social welfare without the other branches of government, this 
would be juristocracy in an immediate and indefensible way. 
75 ROSENBERG, supra note 73. 
76 Standing to bring claims is very broad in South Africa but disputes may not be initiated by a 
judge sua sponte. An Appropriately Activist Court, supra note 74, at 8-10. S. Afr. Const. 
1996,ch. 2, sec. 38: 
Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleg-
ing that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the 
court may grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights. The persons 
who may approach a court are -
a. anyone acting in their own interest; 
b. anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own 
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As a consequence, social justice advocates and affected individuals must 
weigh the various mechanisms for seeking the desired change. In a world of 
limited time and resources, that evaluation must ask whether an investment 
in impact litigation and judicial remedies is worth the loss of time and ener-
gy which might otherwise be devoted to non-adjudicatory strategies. Seek-
ing judicial enforcement requires resources, and those resources would per-
haps be more beneficially invested in popular education, democratic 
pressure, cause-based organizing, or other methods of activism for changes 
to law and policy. 77 
Litigation has a particularly strong potential to detract from popular 
movements for social change where the courts do not grant direct relief to 
the plaintiff. In South Africa, even if an individual plaintiff prevails, their 
needs are not directly served by going to court and are only indirectly and 
imperfectly served by the typical remedy: an order to a government entity to 
reform an inadequate social welfare program. With less direct motivation 
for plaintiffs, there is a greater likelihood that claims will be brought by pub-
lic interest groups, which might otherwise be engaged in popular organizing 
to encourage government action. 
Additionally, judicial action is relatively insecure; it is subject to legisla-
tive revision, constitutional amendment, and executive inaction. Change 
through judicial fiat without popular support may be fleeting, ineffective, or 
merely symbolic. Even successful plaintiffs may have been better served by 
a broad-based political strategy that prioritized prompt action for social 
change. Because courts cannot inaugurate a just society on their own and 
there are opportunity costs associated with any litigation strategy, assess-
ment of the potential transformative capacity of constitutional social rights 
adjudication is critical. 
2. Assessment: Has Social Welfare Improved in South Africa? 
South Africa possesses enumerated social welfare rights, previously 
considered unadvisable, and viable, affirmative judicial enforcement of so-
cial rights, previously considered impossible. But does the South African 
name; 
c. anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of per-
sons; 
d. anyone acting in the public interest; and 
e. an association acting in the interest of its members. 
77 There is a great deal of literature about the relative merits and interrelationship between 
legal and non-legal avenues for change. See, e.g., LEVERAGING THE LAW, supra note 73. 
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model advance social justice? Is life better for those South Africans who 
experienced wide-ranging, government-sponsored socio-economic injustice 
during the apartheid regime? If constitutional adjudication can help address 
socio-economic inequality, a nation with enforceable provisions should evi-
dence improved social welfare conditions. Presumably, if social welfare has 
not improved for the people such rights were meant to protect, there would 
be little impetus for other nations to adopt a system of constitutional protec-
tions. If improvement has happened (or if an otherwise inevitable worsening 
of socio-economic conditions has been inhibited), then it is necessary to ask 
a follow-up question: what role did enumerated social rights play in that ad-
vancement? Hence, any viable assessment of social welfare adjudication 
should allow, first, evaluation of post-apartheid socio-economic develop-
ments and second, evaluation of whether constitutional provisions contri-
buted to the improvements. 
Assessing the success of the Court's jurisprudence on both levels is 
challenging but clearly necessary. One gauge of social welfare develop-
ments generally is overall improvement in the substantive areas enumerated 
in South African social rights provisions, such as housing, education, and 
healthcare, since the enactment of the Constitution.78 Initially, one should 
examine the satisfaction of core socio-economic requirements, especially for 
the poorest South Africans. This inquiry is consistent with the values of the 
post-apartheid Constitution and with the focus of the rights protected in the 
South African Bill of Rights. Satisfaction of minimum subsistence needs for 
very poor persons also represents a particular concern of the Constitutional 
COurt.79 
Unfortunately, it is challenging to answer even this relatively 
straightforward inquiry. In attempting to find reliable socio-economic data, 
the normal difficulties-especially when researching conditions among per-
sons at or below the poverty line-are dramatically compounded by the un-
78 Only a few social rights were included in the Interim Constitution; most socio-economic 
rights were added into the Final Constitution. See supra notes 27, 29; S. AFR. (Interim) 
CONST. 1993,ch.3;S.AFR.CONST. 1996, ch. 2. 
79 Grootboom, supra note 41, at para. 44: 
A society must seek to ensure that the basic necessities of life are provided to all 
if it is to be a society based on human dignity, freedom and equality. To be rea-
sonable, measures cannot leave out of account the degree and extent of the deni-
al of the right they endeavour to realise. Those whose needs are the most urgent 
and whose ability to enjoy all rights therefore is most in peril, must not be ig-
nored by the measures aimed at achieving realisation of the right. 
394 13 UCLA J.lNT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 369 (2008) 
reliability, and occasionally the outright falsity, of apartheid-era statistics.80 
Nevertheless, some helpful statistics are available and relatively trustworthy. 
Housing: Between the end of apartheid and August 2007, the South 
African government spent approximately 44 billion Rand (US $ 5.7 billion) 
on services related to housing, including construction of 2.4 million new 
houses.8! By 2006,9.6% of households were receiving government housing 
subsidies.82 Furthermore, by the end of the 2006-07 fiscal year, 93% of the 
land restitution claims (arising from apartheid-era displacement policies) had 
been settled, with applicants returned to their land or receiving compensation 
for it.83 
Access to basic services: Significant progress has been made with re-
gard to water, sanitation, and electricity access. Household water access in-
creased from 59% to 86% between 1994 and 2007; sanitation service availa-
bility improved from 50% to 71 % in the same time period. Electrification of 
3.5 million homes occurred since apartheid ended and the government re-
cently initiated a free electricity allotment for poor South Africans.84 
Education: As of 2006, attendance rates for students aged 7-15 were 
97.7%.85 Overcrowding in schools and the number of inadequate facilities 
have both decreased significantly since the end of apartheid.86 Additionally, 
80 See Jeremy Seekings, Poverty and Inequality after Apartheid (Centre for Social Science 
Research, University of Cape Town, Working Paper No. 200, 2007), available at 
http://www.sarpn.org.zaJdocuments/d0003024/index.php (stating that the apartheid state nev-
er collected data on poverty among African people); Daniel F. Neff, Subjective Well-Being, 
Poverty and Ethnicity in South Africa: Insights from an Exploratory Analysis, 80 Soc. 
INDICATORS RESEARCH 313 (2006) (stating that during apartheid rule, official statistics did not 
cover the whole of South Africa). Even the South African government has lamented this dif-
ficulty. See Toward lOY ears of Freedom: Progress in the First Decade, Challenges in the 
Second 2 (2004), available at http://www.gcis.gov.zaJdocs/publications/IOtab.pdf. 
81S0UTH AFRICA YEARBOOK 2007/08, at vi (Delien Burger, ed., 2007), available at 
www.gcis.gov.zaJdocs/publications/yearbookiindex.htrnl. 
82 Statistics South Africa, General Household Survey, Statistical Release P0318, at iii-vi (July 
2006), available at www.statssa.gov.zaJpublicationsIP03181P0318July2006.pdf. [hereinafter 
2007 General Household Survey]. Statistics South Africa was created in 1999 by the South 
African parliament in order to "advance the planning, production, analysis, documentation, 
storage, dissemination and use of official and other statistics .... " Statistics Act, No.6 of 
1999, G 19957, s. 2 (Apr. 21,1999). 
83 SOUTH AFRICA YEARBOOK 2008/08, supra note 81, at vi. 
84 Id. at vii. 
85 2007 General Household Survey, supra note 82, at iii-vi. 
86 SOUTH AFRICA YEARBOOK 2007/08, supra note 81, at vii ("Progress between 1996 and 2006 
include the following: the number of overcrowded schools dropped from 51 % to 24%; the 
number of schools with electricity increased from 11,174 to 20,713; schools without access to 
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reported literacy rates have improved since the end of apartheid: up by 1.2% 
for adults (to 82.4%) and up by 5.4% for children (to 93.9%).87 
Health: Between the end of apartheid and mid-2007, eleven new hospit-
als and 1,600 clinics had either been built or upgraded, according to gov-
ernment reports.88 Moreover, healthcare is now free for children under six 
years of age, people with disabilities, pregnant women, and new mothers.89 
Satisfaction with healthcare services is also high; nearly 85% satisfaction for 
public healthcare services and just over 95% for private providers.90 
But such relatively good news must be viewed in the context of the re-
maining statistics about social welfare in South Africa. Even with the im-
provements above, the South African government's 2007 General Household 
Survey shows that many people in South Africa still live in poverty and dis-
advantage: 14.5% of households live in informal structures; 10-12% of per-
sons aged 20 years and above still have no formal education;91 only 13.7% of 
the population is covered by a formal medical aid scheme;92 and the unem-
ployment rate was 28.6% in 2006.93 Statistics from sources outside South 
Africa also tend to show extreme poverty.94 
water decreased from 8,823 to 3,152 in 2006; and schools without toilets decreased from 
3,265 to 1,532."). 
87 BREIT MOORE, ET AL., SOUTH AFRICA 8 (a globalization and education report), available at 
http:// globalizationandeducation.ed. uiuc.eduiStudents%20Projects/GSEB/2007 ISO UTH _ AFR 
ICA.pdf. 
88 SOUTH AFRICA YEARBOOK 2007/08, supra note 81, at vii. 
89Id. 
90 2007 General Household ~urvey, supra note 82, at iv. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93Id. at xx. Accord CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK: SOUTH AFRICA, 
https:llwww.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbooklgeos/sf.html(last visited July 7, 
2008) (unemployment rate in 2008 is 21.7%); World Bank, Country Brief-South Africa 
(March 2008), 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/ EXTERNAL/COUNTRIESI AFRICAEXTI 
SOUTHAFRICAEXTN/O,menuPK:368086-pagePK: 141132-piPK: 1411 07-theSitePK:36805 
7,00.htrnl (last visited July 7, 2008) (noting a 28.4% unemployment rate). 
94 More than 43% of South Africans live below a poverty line ofR 3,000 (U.S $440) per year. 
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REpORT 2008: STATE OF THE WORLD'S 
HUMAN RIGHTS 272, http://www.amnesty.org/enilibrary/assetIPOLI0/001l2008/enl9a3b2fec-
2cOd-Ildd-bOb9-f7948efblOd4/poIl00012008eng.pdf (last visited July 7, 2008). Fifty per-
cent of the population lives in developing country conditions, compared with 13% of the pop-
ulation that lives in "first world" conditions. Additionally, over one-third of the children in 
South Africa suffer from chronic malnutrition. World Bank, Country Brief-South Africa, su-
pra note 93. 
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Although progress has been made, it has undeniably been limited in 
scope. Available and reliable data show an increase in available housing, 
medical clinics, and school enrollment, but many people are still living with 
unmet social welfare needs. The stark socio-economic legacy of apartheid 
will haunt South Africa for many more decades. 
However, while examination of socio-economic statistics may answer 
the question of whether socio-economic conditions have improved, it cannot 
resolve the more focused question regarding the role courts have played in 
the improvement. The concern of this article is an even more elusive com-
ponent of the overall assessment of success: to understand the contribution 
of the Constitution and the Court's jurisprudence to the advancement of so-
cial justice. Have the constitutional protections and court enforcement sup-
ported positive socio-economic change? 
3. Assessment: Contributions from Constitutional Protections? 
In the absence of any improvement, it could be reasonably asserted that 
the Court has failed in its appointed task. 95 But where, as is the case in 
South Africa, there is some improvement, how can one evaluate the role of 
constitutional social welfare rights? It is impossible to compare the real 
South Africa with a hypothetical post-apartheid country without constitu-
tional social welfare rights. Any quantitative or otherwise precise determi-
nation is undeniably out of the question, as it would be if one were assessing 
contributions to changes associated with civil and political rights. 96 To pro-
ceed, one must consider carefully the kinds of change courts are capable of 
and the limited scope of their powers. The effects of the South African 
judgments can then be considered as a specific example of the general capa-
bilities of courtS.97 
What is the appropriate approach to such an analysis? First, one must 
95 We are spared the even more challenging task of assessing if the constitutional provisions 
only mitigated otherwise worse conditions by the evidence presented supra in Part IlI.A.2. 
96 Of course, some intriguing attempts have been made at quantitative studies to demonstrate 
social welfare commitments, but they cannot isolate causes. See, e.g., Ben-Bassat & Dahan, 
supra note 4 (surveying the inclusion of constitutional commitments to social rights in 68 
countries). 
97 This is not to assert that evaluation of the social benefit of individual judgments is not poss-
ible. Although beyond the scope of this article, an assessment of the pragmatic consequences 
of Grootboom or TAG would at least reveal whether the South African judiciary needs to 
reassess its individual rulings, and to question whether the courts should take on a more parti-
cipatory post-judgment role. The most obvious, and clearly constitutionally permissible, op-
tion would be the use of supervisory orders in connection with its judgments. 
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adjust expectations: courts cannot inaugurate a socially just society on their 
own. Expectations should therefore be modest in scope. This is particularly 
true at the earliest stage in the development of social rights adjudication. In-
stitutional reserve that might be thought of as excessive in later eras is more 
justified in the first decade of adjudication and in the absence of comparable 
models. It is reasonable to expect only limited contributions from courts, not 
full-scale change. 
Second, expectations must be appropriate in kind as well. One must 
identify the forms of judicial contribution that are realistic in light of courts' 
structural and institutional limits. Indeed, the kind of change courts can faci-
litate will be different from the change typically expected of popular move-
ments; they will follow adjudication's strengths and reflect the unique nature 
of the judicial role. In the same way that differentiated incorporation 
showed the courts defining their capacity to address social welfare cases in a 
manner consistent with their limited capabilities, the observer must evaluate 
the contributions of courts with similarly realistic expectations. 
Once observers adjust expectations in light of these insights, they are 
better equipped to identify judicial contributions to socio-economic change. 
Notably, a great deal of criticism may still be-and in the South African sit-
uation probably should be-leveled at the political branches for an inade-
quate response to poverty.98 But this portion of this article questions the ef-
fectiveness of constitutional rights and the jurisprudence of the South 
African Constitutional Court as tools for combating social injustice. If one 
examines the South African case law looking specifically for the desired, 
modest social welfare improvements permitted within institutional strictures, 
what has the Court accomplished? If it is possible to identify any positive 
contributions made by the South African courts, one must then ask if other 
nations' courts could make similar advances. If so, the result of such an in-
quiry would be one set of potential judicial contributions to the struggle for 
social justice that could foreseeably be improved upon and expanded over 
time. 
B. The Contributions o/Constitutional Courts 
The causes of social change are difficult to assess, whether in the realm 
of civil and political rights or substantive socio-economic equality. This is 
as true of the contributions from civil society as it is of those from courts and 
98 See, e.g., BBC News, ANC Seeks to Calm War of Words, British Broadcasting Corp., Nov. 
11, 2004, available at http://news.bbc.co.ukl2lhilafrica/4054273.stm (last visited July 28, 
2008). 
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constitutions. Even the most detennined statisticians could not defmitively 
apportion credit or blame to one actor or feature among the many factors that 
influence social welfare. In light of this, one must ask several basic ques-
tions regarding the courts' behavior in order to evaluate their actions in the 
area of socio-economic rights: do they refrain from hann to the nation's fi-
nancial stability or rule of law (the long-standing concern of all social rights 
adjudication)?;99 do they use their particular institutional strengths to ad-
vance social welfare?; and, do they support other elements of the struggle for 
social justice? Court action to advance social justice that complies with 
these criteria is most easily supported as appropriate and useful judicial in-
volvement. 
1. Evident Contributions of the South African Court 
Ultimately, in what must be an incomplete assessment, it is reasonable 
to conclude that the South African Court has achieved clear success in one 
area, modest successes in other areas, and additional indetenninate positive 
effects. 
At the very least, the Court's jurisprudence has been clearly successful 
on a symbolic level. By hearing claims and evaluating government actions 
against the backdrop of constitutional social welfare protections, the Court 
reinforces the South African vision of substantive equality. As the Court has 
said, "The fact that poverty and homelessness still plague many South Afri-
cans is a painful reminder of the chasm that still needs to be bridged before 
the constitutional ideal to establish a society based on social justice and im-
proved quality of life for all citizens is fully achieved." 100 By reiterating the 
constitutional pre-commitments, the Court reminds South Africans of their 
promises to create "a society based on democratic values, social justice and 
fundamental human rights" and to "improve the quality of life of all citi-
zens"-promises not yet kept by their elected officials. 101 
Modest success has been evident in the Court's judgments in the specific 
substantive social welfare disputes brought before it. In multiple cases, the 
Court has identified when the govemment has failed constitutional require-
ments: inadequate programs and procedures related to housing, as in Groot-
boom and Berea Township; healthcare, as in TAC; and general social welfare 
99 See Sunstein, supra note 13; see also Christiansen, Adjudicating Non-Justiciable Rights, 
supra note 3, at 342-53. 
100 President of Republic of S. Afr. v. Modderklip Boerdery (Pry) Ltd, (8) BCLR 786 (CC), 36 
(S. Afr. 2005), available at http://www.constitutionaIcourt.org.za/Archimages/3493.PDF. 
101 S. AFR. CON ST. 1996, pmbl. 
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services, as in Njongi. These judgments can be considered successful be-
cause the Court has held the government accountable for the quality of its 
response to persistent economic inequality; but it is only a partial success. 
Official responses to Grootboom and TAC asserted a willingness to comply 
with the Court's orders but implementation has been inconsistent and incom-
plete. 102 Some direct and effective changes have been made, such as in-
creased distribution of Nevirapine following TAC, and evictions prevented 
as a result of the order in Berea Township, but other change has been inex-
cusably SIOW.103 However, where there are post-judgment failings, the fault 
lies primarily with the government rather than the Court. Nevertheless, in 
evaluating the use of judicial remedies to effectuate positive social change, 
one must conclude that the overall effectiveness has been only moderate. 104 
The unknowable element of the success determination is the impact the 
threat of judicial review has had in promoting social welfare legislation at a 
national and provincial level. Hopefully, the combination of enumerated so-
cial rights with potential enforceability by an active jUdiciary has effectively 
reinforced the government's earliest commitments to social transformation. 
Certainly, the potential for enforcement supports the advocacy of civil socie-
ty organizations, activists, and community members. This is particularly the 
case following the Court's ruling in Berea Township. The interpretation of 
the Constitution which requires government officials to participate in "mea-
ningful engagement" with affected communities, and the potential for judi-
cial orders to enforce that requirement should significantly empower affected 
persons and community organizers. 105 This supports the further realization 
of social justice without direct involvement by the courts and, very benefi-
cially, coordinates cause lawyering and broader popular involvement. 
Thus the conclusion at the current stage is that thirteen years after the 
South African Constitutional Court began hearing cases under the post-
102 Siri Gloppen, Social Rights Litigation as Transformation: A South African Perspective 16-
17 (Chr. Michelsen Institute, Working Paper 2005: 3), available at 
http://www.crni.no/publications/2005/wp/wp2005-3.pdf. 
103 See, e.g., Davis, supra note 22, at 56 ("A right asserted successfully by litigants who then 
wait in vain for any tangible benefit to flow from the costly process of litigation soon be-
comes an illusory right-hardly the sort of right so essential to the long-term success of the 
constitutional project launched but a decade ago!"). 
104 Notably, compliance with the TAC decision was significantly better than Grootboom. It is 
unclear why that is. It may be partially the result of Court action as the TAC ruling is more 
direct and specific in its final orders. 
105 Berea Township, supra note 48, at paras. 9-23. 
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apartheid Constitution, there is reasonable evidence of initial success on the 
Court's part at openly reaffirming the nation's commitment to transforma-
tion, actively identifying specific areas of governmental failings, and pas-
sively pressuring the government to advance the social justice goals of the 
constitutional text. These accomplishments, though limited, highlight poten-
tial capacities of other courts to achieve similar progress through socio-
economic rights adjudication. 
2. Potential Contributions from Other Courts 
In light of the preceding insights, what initial conclusions can be made 
about the ways in which constitutional enforcement of social rights can ad-
vance social justice? The core question is whether or not constitutional pro-
tection of social welfare rights and constitutional courts' enforcement of 
those rights can help remedy persistent economic inequality? If one looks to 
South Africa, for now the answer is a qualified yes. South Africa evidences 
that courts can adjudicate social rights without destroying the rule of law or 
the fiscal security of the country. Within institutional constraints and despite 
judicial caution, the Court has advanced the socially transformative com-
mitments of the South African Constitution. Moreover, the exportable 
process of differentiated incorporation allows other countries to design a si-
milarly viable jurisprudence for their own constitutional milieu. 
The general conclusion, required by the limited role of courts and the 
uncertain interaction of popular processes and adjudication, is that court en-
forcement can support social change within institutional constraints. Thus, 
while constitutionally-based social welfare rights and judicial enforcement 
of them cannot independently create social change, such rights can supple-
ment other legal and non-legal approaches to the advancement of social jus-
tice. Specifically, enforceable constitutional rights provide at least four gen-
eral classes of assistance: 1) remedying evident rights violations; 2) 
influencing government action through the threat of judicial enforcement; 3) 
supporting non-adjudicatory processes; and 4) reinforcing constitutional val-
ues for social transformation. 
a. Remedying rights violations 
At a minimal level, a court can adjudicate and remedy obvious viola-
tions of enumerated social welfare rights. Such judgments place the adjudi-
cating court on its most secure footing vis-a-vis separation of powers argu-
ments. In cases where the right is enumerated and intended to be enforced, 
and where the violation of that right is obvious and within the court's juris-
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diction, the court can act with the least fear of criticism. Obviousness of a 
violation can result from the clear textual language of the right or from evi-
dence of a gross or inexcusable violation of a right. The former occurs whe-
rever a court engages in negative enforcement, requiring removal of a go-
vernmental obstacle to enjoyment of a right. 106 The latter was evident in 
South Africa in the Constitutional Court's response to the state's arbitrary 
denial of Ms. Njongi's disability benefits. 107 
Although such rulings may occur only in limited circumstances, their 
capacity to impact social welfare is not always so limited. The TAe holding 
related to the narrow issue of the availability of Nevirapine to halt mother-
to-child HIV transmission is an example of this. 108 The Constitutional 
Court's order resulted in a significant expansion of testing and counseling 
related to HIV transmission, but it also identified minimum standards that 
presumably apply in many related healthcare circumstances. 109 Furthermore, 
the court's order highlighted an additional risk of inadequate governmental 
action: the judicial response may require the state to take greater action than 
the country's constitution would otherwise require, or would otherwise leave 
to the discretion of the executive or legislature. Even a holding affecting on-
lya single person (as in Njongi llO) can force the government to rethink and 
reformulate its response to a diverse set of social welfare needs. 
b. Threatening unfavorable judicial attention 
Regardless of the eventual outcome, court involvement can be assumed 
to be disfavored by the political branches. Even generally popular govern-
ment practices will have unflattering attention drawn to them by at least one 
side in the proceedings. Moreover, a courtroom loss for a governmental so-
cial welfare program, or in response to state inaction, is a significant blow to 
the executive and legislative branches. It is a public rebuke and negative 
evaluation of the non-judicial actor. As mentioned above, judicial remedies 
may circumvent measures that the legislature or executive did or would have 
otherwise chosen. As a consequence, the passive threat of court involvement 
motivates government actors to legislate proactively and appropriately. 
This threat also encourages government attention to previous judicial 
106 See, e.g., Soobramoney, supra note 39, at para. 34 (state must "desist from preventing or 
impairing the right of access to adequate housing"). 
107 Njongi, supra note 56. 
\08 TAC, supra note 45, at para. 135. 
109 ld. 
1 \0 Njongi, supra note 56. 
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rulings. To the extent litigation losses are disfavored, prior rulings will in-
fonn government decision-making. Previous decisions can influence both 
the likelihood and the content of social welfare legislation and policies. For 
example, Soobramoney announced the Court's expectation that legislation 
consider "those whose needs are most urgent" in order to satisfy constitu-
tional social welfare obligations. lll Ideally, the state will account for this re-
quirement in the fonnulation of future social welfare policies; not just in re-
lation to the particular issues under adjudication in the original case, housing 
and child welfare, but more broadly. The South African Constitutional 
Court's reiteration of that requirement in Berea Township highlights for gov-
ernment policy makers and legislators that there should be evident consid-
eration of the needs of very poor persons in all social welfare legislation and 
related government action. 112 
c. Supporting non-adjudicatory remedies 
Perhaps one of the most important things an adjudicating court can do is 
provide support for non-adjudicatory processes. While acknowledging the 
inability of judicial action to fully remedy endemic social injustice, courts 
can nonetheless empower popular movements, non-governmental organiza-
tions, and activists with their rulings. Furthennore, holdings that support the 
role of civil society decrease concerns about judicial legitimacy and capacity 
by encouraging decision-making by competent stake-holders outside the 
judicial process. 
The South African example of Berea Township is an exceptionally 
promising instance of this. By calling for a process of "meaningful engage-
ment" with affected members of the relevant community, 113 the Court's hold-
ing encourages community involvement. Moreover, because the Court de-
fined meaningful engagement as an element of the reasonableness 
requirement first announced in Soobramoney,t14 the Court has indirectly 
called for engagement whenever government action directly impacts social 
welfare. By announcing this standard, the Court both empowered communi-
ty groups and disentangled itself from many potential disputes by returning 
them to the political realm. 
III Soobramoney, supra note 39, at para. 44. 
112 Berea Township, supra note 48, para. 20. 
113 The meaningful engagement requirement is discussed in Berea Township, supra note 48, 
paras. 9-23. 
114 Soobramoney, supra note 39, at paras. 39-44. 
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d. Reinforcing the founding generation's constitutional values 
The final contribution that can be made by adjudication of enumerated 
social welfare rights is to remind the polity and its leaders about their extant 
constitutional commitments. Such reminders strengthen the role of the con-
stitution in a society and accentuate the interrelatedness of traditional civil 
rights and social welfare rights. Any court can reinforce constitutional val-
ues. This is a task that looks nearly identical for socio-economic rights and 
for civil and political rights: in interpreting the enumerated constitutional 
provisions, a court reminds the country of past commitments to a different 
present. 
In South Africa, the Court has frequently used the context of social 
rights cases to reiterate the fundamentally transformative nature of the South 
African Constitution and the incomplete status of that transformation in the 
area of social welfare. As Chief Justice Chaskalson said in the first substan-
tive social welfare case to come before the Court, 
We live in a society in which there are great disparities in wealth. 
Millions of people are living in deplorable conditions in great pover-
ty .... These conditions already existed when the Constitution was 
adopted and a commitment to address them, and transform our socie-
ty into one in which there will be human dignity, freedom and equali-
ty, lies at the heart of our new constitutional order. I 15 
Of course, these four different potential contributions often interrelate 
and are distinguished purely for analytical purposes. For example, the vali-
dation a court gives to civil society organizations allows those groups to po-
pularly redefine what constitutes an obvious violation of an express right, 
which a court need not hesitate to enforce. Similarly, reinforcement of the 
transformational values of the Constitution further legitimates civil society 
groups seeking to advance those goals and gives them additional tools when 
interacting with governmental officials. 
All of these contributions share three important characteristics: they do 
no harm to the financial basis of the nation or support for the rule of law (be-
cause of differentiated incorporation and the initial modesty of courts); they 
work within institutional limits and rely on institutional strengths, especially 
when they advocate for the socially transformative values of the Constitu-
tion; and they support non-judicial solutions to socio-economic problems by 
empowering civil society and supporting popular claims for socio-economic 
justice. 
liS Id. at para. 8. 
404 13 UCLA J.INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 369 (2008) 
C. Socio-economic Rights and Judicial Activism 
As a final note, it must be admitted that the potential impact of courts in 
the area of social welfare sounds unlike the role traditionally ascribed to the 
judiciary. Is this not too much authority for courts? Novel forms of adjudi-
cation, expanded substantive authority at the expense of the executive and 
legislature, and judgments involving policy-making and finances raise the 
specter of "judicial activism." The social welfare adjudication discussed in 
this article very actively engages with, and advocates for, the values placed 
in the Constitution by its founding, or amending generation. 
However, even if one assumes that the term has meaning other than as 
an easy political epithet, what has been occurring in the South African Court 
is not judicial activism. It is a more significant role for the courts, but not 
one inconsistent with a generally-accepted understanding of judicial review. 
It is judicial enforcement of express constitutional values, enumerated in the 
official text by the constituent authoring body with an expectation of realiza-
tion. 116 Such adjudication is something relatively novel; and "novel" itself is 
often reflexively disparaged by some critics; especially when applied to the 
role of the judiciary. Nevertheless, an evolved understanding of courts' ca-
pacity to advance social justice through enforcement of socio-economic 
rights has the ability to shift our understanding of the courts' capabilities and 
the role constitutional courts play in advancing constitutional values. More-
over, it may significantly alter what citizens expect of their state and influ-
ence their general assumptions regarding the state's capacity to address so-
cial welfare. 
CONCLUSION 
The frequency of inclusion of socio-economic rights in modem constitu-
tions is evidence of the increasing popularity of foundational pre-
commitments to social welfare. Nevertheless, few countries' courts have en-
forced such rights and only the Republic of South Africa has crafted a com-
prehensive, affIrmative approach to enumerated social welfare rights. The 
novelty of its jurisprudence is reflected in the modesty of the South African 
116 Notably, I am generally resisting making claims about social welfare protections arising 
from unenumerated rights. But much of the discussion of the potential for court-supported 
social change could apply to enforcement of unenumerated rights reflective of other express 
constitutional rights, for example, the recognition of a socio-economic minimum core as a 
pre-condition for realization of civil and political rights. Obviously, such a usage needs juri-
sprudential justification (that it is called for by the relevant constitution) even if the court fol-
lows the adjudicatory viability argument suggested in this article. 
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Constitutional Court's early judgments. 117 
The Court's willingness to adjudicate social rights nevertheless presents 
a dramatic challenge to the traditional opposition to judicial enforcement of 
constitutional social welfare rights. There is a revolutionary and instructive 
element to the Court's work in this area. Through the process of differen-
tiated incorporation, the Court evaluated the range of historical arguments 
against adjudication of socio-economic rights, disregarded those arguments 
that were invalid or inapt in its particular constitutional setting, and then 
crafted a social rights jurisprudence that expressly addressed the remaining, 
legitimate concerns. The result is an exportable model for social rights adju-
dication: a country-specific jurisprudence that disregards concerns invalid in 
the importing country but accommodates valid justiciability concerns 
through domestically-appropriate processes. 
But even if adoption is possible for other countries with enumerated so-
cial rights, is it productive of improved social welfare? This article con-
cludes that when one appropriately evaluates the circumscribed capabilities 
of courts, there remain significant possible contributions. Specifically, en-
forced constitutional rights can provide at least four classes of assistance: 1) 
remedying glaring rights violations, 2) influencing government action 
through the threat of judicial enforcement, 3) supporting extra-judicial social 
welfare action, and 4) reinforcing constitutional values for social transforma-
tion. If one can temper expectations in light of the appropriate role for a ju-
diciary and forgive some of the excessive caution by the South African pio-
neers in this area of jurisprudence, there is good reason to believe that courts 
and constitutions can contribute to the advancement of social justice and 
may increasingly do so. 
117 The South African Constitutional Court has only been hearing cases since 1995. Hist. of 
the Const. Ct. of S. Afr., 
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/thecourt/history.htm#gather. Its first social rights 
case, Soobramoney, was heard in 1998. See Soobramoney, supra note 39. 
